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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Title of Dissertation: An Empirical Study on the Need for Anchor Operation 
Education and Training 
 
Degree: MSc 
 
 
A large number of accidents in respect of anchoring operations have been reported 
by marine accident investigation bodies. Especially in the 2000s, the casualties 
involving oil pollution have been significant among such cases.  
 
According to the trend of the peak gust observed in Japan, there is a tendency for it 
to be increasing year by year. In addition, the prediction of tropical cyclones says the 
size will also be increasing with the result that ships are expected to be exposed to 
stronger winds than before. 
 
Research is being made on the current regulations for both technical and training 
requirements at the international convention level. However, this seems to be 
insufficient to prevent accidents occurring regarding anchoring operations.  
 
Based on the statistical analysis of the accident cases using Quantification method 
type III, the major factors of accident are identified; that is a lack of education and 
training of the anchoring operation under severe weather conditions. 
 
Further, a proposed syllabus on the anchoring operation is presented and discussed 
taking into consideration both the education and training aspects. Finally, the 
development of an anchoring simulator is suggested. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Anchoring, Education, Training, Syllabus  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Accidents at sea never disappear although the International Maritime 
Organization and its member states have established new regulations to prevent the 
same kind of accidents happening again. As an example, the Titanic disaster in 1912 
triggered the establishment of the SOLAS convention in 1914 (IMO, 2004). In the 
twenty-third session of the Assembly, the Secretary General, E. E. Mitropoulos 
(2003) said in his speech that: 
While our prime duty will be to act proactively to ensure that accidents do not 
happen in the first place, our work should also be directed towards ensuring 
that, once an accident has taken place, the system is there to minimize its 
impact on human lives, property and the environment. 
 
In this light, the IMO should act proactively to ensure safe shipping and a clean 
environment. The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the facts behind anchor 
handling accidents and to make recommendations regarding maritime education and 
training to help prevent accidents in the future. 
 
 
1.1 Importance of the Study 
 
The accidents related to anchor handling have been reported by several 
maritime accident investigation organizations. Actually, some of them have been fatal 
accidents related to the loss of human life. It is generally said that the cause of more 
than 80 % of accidents at sea is the human factor. Nevertheless, when the accidents 
are examined, the competency in anchor handling seems to be the lack of 
competence of the seafarers at a certain level. A lot of accidents with anchor 
handling have happened under severe weather. In fact, there is no requirement on 
anchor handling training under severe weather as emergency training. In addition, an 
anchor windlass takes on the key role in respect of anchor handling because the 
operation of anchors is controlled by that as well as being used for the mooring winch. 
 2 
 
Thus, the anchor windlass is a vital part of the ship‟s installation in allowing proper 
handling of the ship‟s ground tackle, and it is a most important aspect for the safety of 
the ship and crew (Vervloesem, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, climate change today is being focused on. Over the last 
decade, extraordinary peak gusts have been observed due to the growth of the 
tropical cyclone in size. In addition, the prediction in the future on the size of tropical 
cyclones says that these will become bigger than before due to global warming. For 
this reason, ships may be exposed to stronger winds than before in the future. 
 
In spite of the situation mentioned above, there have been few discussions on 
the education and training of anchor handling. There is, therefore, a need to review 
the current education and training program.  
 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
The objectives of the study are as follows: 
I. To examine anchor handling accident cases 
II. To define the relevant regulations on anchor handling 
III. To identify the causes of anchor handling accidents and their correlation 
IV. To develop an anchor handling education and training syllabus  
 
 
1.3 Order of Presentation 
 
The order of presentation is composed in a logical way to achieve the 
objectives of this dissertation. 
 
In Chapter 2, the background of the study is mentioned. The accident cases on 
anchor handling and the findings in several maritime accident investigation bodies 
are introduced. In fact, the accident casualties have been reported in the 2000s. In 
addition, the weather impact, especially a variation on peak gusts in Japan and the 
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serious future prediction has been researched. 
 
In Chapter 3, a characteristic of anchor windlass and regulatory bases on 
anchor windlass and requirements of education and training under the current 
situation are discussed. 
 
In Chapter 4, the analysis of the accident data mentioned in Chapter 2 is 
presented by using a statistical method named Quantification Method type III. Before 
applying the statistical method, the classification of the accident was done by a group 
of experienced seafarers using the 5-M of the accident factors. The analysis 
identifies the relevance of each accident factor. 
 
In Chapter 5, based on the analysis in Chapter 4 and current training 
requirement mentioned in Chapter 3, a model syllabus on education and training of 
anchor handling for seafarers is proposed. In addition, the implementation of anchor 
handling courses is discussed by being divided into on-shore and on-board 
education and training. 
 
 
1.4 Scope and methodology 
 
First of all, this study started from collecting the accident cases regarding 
anchor handling or dragging anchor as much as possible. The author was able to 
collect accident cases that had occurred in Japan. These accident cases are written 
in the publication of accident verdicts from Japan Marine Accidents Inquiry Agent. 
Second, the author asked the Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), the 
United Kingdom and Swedish Transport Agency to provide accident cases on anchor 
handling and dragging anchor. They agreed willingly and even included unpublished 
information. Third, the author made contact with a person from South Korea to 
provide South Korean accident cases. Fortunately, these are available on the web 
site, but written only in Korean. The contact person, however, willingly provided the 
translated papers. In addition, the author found other accident cases in a publication 
from the Nautical Institute. 
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Furthermore, climate change is also highlighted. The statistics on peak gust at 
weather stations in Japan were analyzed to assess a trend. 
 
Based on the accident data, the working group composed of experienced 
seafarers made a classification by using 5-M of accident factors. By using the 
classification, the author applied the Quantification method type III and examined 
those accident cases. 
 
This study, therefore, intends to identify the cause of anchor handling 
accidents and how to implement a comprehensive anchor handling education and 
training.  
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Chapter 2. Background – Accident cases and weather 
impact 
 
 
Many accident cases related to anchor handling and windlass operation have 
been reported over the years. In this chapter, the status of accidents on anchor 
handling is introduced. The author has focused on climate change from the past. 
Especially, the peak gust in several places in Japan has been researched and 
analyzed. Furthermore, as global warming progresses, the future prediction made by 
a research institute is also mentioned in this chapter. 
 
2.1 Accident Reports on anchoring operation 
 
The accident reports which are set out in this section are collected from several 
Maritime Accident Investigation Organizations such as the Japan Marine Accident 
Tribunal (formerly the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency, Japan.), the Maritime 
Accident Investigation Bureau (the United Kingdom), the Swedish Maritime Safety 
Inspectorate and the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal. Furthermore, several incident 
cases are also been reported. The brief overviews of accidents which have occurred 
are given below in chronological order.  
 
i. Cornhusker Mariner (7th July 1953) 
An American steamer, Cornhusker Mariner was anchored at Pusan offing. After 
anchoring, a radio officer received a weather report about a typhoon. It was 
reported that a typhoon would be about 200 miles to the north of Pusan next 
early morning. The master concluded the typhoon was passing and would pose 
no threat. That was apparently overlooked by the master. However, the master 
left the oral order that the anchor was to be checked every 15 minutes and the 
master was to be called in the event of any change in the anchor bearings or 
weather. These orders were passed from one watch to the next. There were no 
written orders except general instructions in the chart room. As the wind and 
swell getting stronger, the third officer (OOW) did not notify the master on the 
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weather change. Furthermore, the third officer did not stand by radar. When he 
used it, it took time to warm up. Even though he detected the dragging anchor, 
he never notified the engine room or the master. Due to his negligence, the ship 
was aground (Cahill, 2002). 
 
ii. Donacilla (3rd October 1967) 
A tanker, Donacilla (70,010 tons) anchored in the Thames estuary with three 
shackles. At that time, the wind was force 6. The engine was immobilized due to 
maintenance. Suddenly, a heavy squall struck causing the ship to start dragging. 
Although the chain was veered out and the other anchor was dropped, the ship 
was aground (Cahill, 2002). 
 
iii. Wealkehy Trade (1st February 1969) 
A general cargo ship, Wealkehy Trade (5,000 tons) was anchoring at Mutsure 
offing, Japan without anchor watch on bridge. The other anchoring vessel, 
Haeyang Ho‟s chief officer found that Wealkehy Trade and the other two ships 
collided lightly as Wealkehy Trade dragged her anchor. Subsequently, Wealkehy 
Trade was approaching toward Haeyang Ho with danger of collision. Although 
Wealkehy Trade started engine astern to avoid collision with Haeyang Ho, the 
ship continued to drag the anchor. Consequently two ships collided. The cause 
of the accident was the operational negligence of Wealkehy Trade on improper 
anchor watch (KMST, 1969). 
 
iv. London Valour (9th April 1970) 
A bulk carrier, London Valour (15,947 tons) anchored at Genoa offing, just 
outside of the breakwater for unloading her cargo to await the berth. The chain 
length veered in the water was not enough when the wind getting higher. The 
master neglected to pay out more chain. Although all crew were qualified and 
competent, the vessel started to drag her anchor due to high swell and strong 
wind. At that time, the main engine was maintained and the chief engineer was 
not notified to bring the engines to a state of readiness. Consequently, the ship 
was aground and sank alongside the breakwater without letting go the other 
anchor. 20 crew lost their lives (Cahill, 2002). 
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v. Canberra (14th August 1973) 
A cruise liner, Canberra (44,807 tons) anchored at St. Thomas offing, the Virgin 
Islands. Although the master wrote the order book on strict anchor watch, the 
OOW notice late and not detect the anchor dragged immediately when a heavy 
squall struck. When the OOW informed the master, he notified the engineer to 
ready the engines. The master detected the anchor dragged when he came up 
to bridge. In spite of master‟s great effort with using of engines, the vessel was 
aground (Cahill, 2002). 
 
vi. Yushio Maru (17th April 1976) 
A cargo ship, Yushio Maru (1,995 tons) was approaching anchorage. The master 
of Yushio Maru found the other anchoring ship, Aroho (4,967 tons) was leaving 
anchorage. Yushio Maru anchored just only 150 meter from Aroho. After Yushio 
Maru anchored, the OOW looked out to check other ship condition under strong 
wind. When the master of Yushio Maru recognized Aroho was dragging anchor, 
he ordered to stand by crews and ready to use engine. However, Aroho collided 
with Yushio Maru. The cause of the accident was the operational negligence of 
Yushio Maru and severe weather because Yushio Maru was anchored closely 
from Aroho (KMST, 1976). 
 
vii. No. 5 Yunam Ho (7th April 1977) 
A log carrier, No.5 Yunam Ho (3,949 tons) anchored at Pusan South anchorage 
under strong wind and high swell. As many ships were anchoring at the area, the 
ship could not make an enough room for anchorage. For this reason, the ship 
veered 3 shackles of anchor cable with using engine continuously. However, due 
to strong wind and high swell, the ship started to drag her anchor. Consequently, 
the ship collided with the other ship. The cause of the accident was severe 
weather and operational negligence of the ship (KMST, 1977). 
 
viii. No.2 Donam Ho (10th March 1978) 
A general cargo ship, No.2 Donam Ho (1,998 tonnage) anchored at Pusan N2 
anchorage to unload the cargo. As commenced the cargo work, the master and 
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the chief engineer left the ship to shore. The duty officer found that the weather 
was getting worse. In order to prevent to dragging anchor, the duty officer 
ordered paying out one more shackle and tried to keep the position. Despite of 
the effort of preventing to drag the anchor, the weather was getting worse. The 
duty officer decided to stop the cargo work as well as reporting that situation to 
the company. Even though the engine was used variously by under his 
command, the ship dragged her anchor. Consequently the ship collided with the 
other anchoring vessel. The cause of the accident was the operational 
negligence of the ship under severe weather (KMST, 1979a). 
 
ix. No.2 Dongmyoung Ho (27th August 1978) 
A general cargo ship, No.2 Dongmyoung Ho (4,502 tons) anchored in Malaysia 
water to load the cargo. As suddenly the wind force increased to 9 BF, the duty 
officer reported to the master. The master ordered the engine ready. However, 
engine could not use properly and that ship started dragging her anchor. 
Consequently, the ship collided with the other anchoring ship. The cause of the 
accident was the operational negligence of Dongmyoung Ho. This ship should 
consider the situation under severe weather and also should be able to use the 
engine any time under any situation (KMST, 1979b). 
 
x. Syogo Maru (23rd August 1982) 
A cargo ship, Syogo Maru was approaching Pusan anchorage in order to anchor. 
Due to the severe weather, the master committed operational negligence and 
carelessness of watch keeping during approaching anchorage. Consequently, 
the ship collided with the other anchoring ship. The cause of the accident was an 
operational negligence of Syogo Maru. Syogo Maru should maintain a proper 
look out all the time by sight and hearing as well as by all available means 
appropriately in the prevailing circumstances and conditions. However, Syogo 
Maru did not have a sufficient look out properly (KMST, 1982). 
 
xi. OSA Vigoroso (28th September 1983) 
A Log carrier, OSA Vigoroso (6,500 tons) was under construction alongside at 
quay in M shipyard in Pusan. A typhoon was approaching to that area. Shipping 
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company had decided to shift from quay to anchorage. 8 persons was onboard 
and anchored at M-0 anchorage. The problem of OSA Vigoroso was not under 
command due to no installation of engine compartment on the ship. While OSA 
Vigoroso started dragging her anchor, the crew could not handle the ship. 
Consequently, OSA Vigoroso continued to drag her anchor and collided with the 
other anchoring ship. The cause of the accident was an operational negligence 
and insufficient procedures for emergency situation under severe weather 
(KMST, 1983). 
 
xii. Cahr Kwei (28th September 1983) 
A general cargo ship, Cahr Kwei (12,185 tons) anchored at Pohang anchorage 
At that time typhoon was approaching. The ship started to drag her anchor but 
the engine was not used to avoid dragging. Consequently, the ship collided with 
the other anchoring ship. The ship did not take any action due to the observance 
of good seamanship in accordance with the Rules. At that time, there was no 
dragging ship in the vicinity of Cahr Kwei even though weather was severe. 
Taking into consideration of the circumstance, the ship had a problem on the 
anchor holding power. The cause of the accident was an operational negligence 
and a lack of positive action for emergency situation under severe weather 
(KMST, 1984). 
 
xiii. Marine Bounty (13th January 1987) 
A bulk carrier, Marine Bounty (57,561 tons) anchored at designated anchorage 
of Pohang offing, South Korea. This ship was aground due to stormy weather. 
Cause of the accident was 1) the OOW‟s improper anchor watch which was 
monitored by using only radar, 2) the master‟s overconfident to the weather and 
his shore leave and 3) Lack of proper standing order to the duty officer. This 
case was caused by operational negligence (KMST, 1988). 
 
xiv. Oriental Ace (15th July, 1987) 
Oriental Ace (3,963 tons) anchored at Yeosu offing, South Korea. Typhoon was 
approaching at that time. As it became strong wind and high swell, the master 
decided to escape offshore. He ordered to heave up anchor, yet the anchor was 
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not heaved up due to relatively high air draft and strong wind and high swell 
although the engine was stood by. Consequently, the ship was aground and the 
fuel oil was leaked. The cause of the accident was 1) a choice of anchorage, 2) 
insufficient length of anchor cable (insufficient holding power) and 3) the 
master‟s improper operation when the anchor was heaved up (KMST, 1987a). 
 
xv. Atlas Counselor (31st August 1987) 
A bulk carrier, Atlas Counselor (12,771 tons) anchored at Pohang offing, South 
Korea with ballast condition. Typhoon was approaching at that time. As it 
became strong wind and high swell, the master veered out the anchor chain and 
stood by engine. Despite of the effort, the ship was dragging anchor and the 
master requested two tug boats in order to prevent to collide with a breakwater. 
However, the tug boats could not come out. Although the ship avoided a collision 
with a breakwater, it was aground to beach. The cause of the accident was not 
only due to severe weather but also due to the unskillful master‟s operational 
misjudgment on choosing proper anchorage to get an enough anchor holding 
power, taking in ballast water to reduce effect of wind force and an improper 
operation of anchor handling (KMST, 1987b).  
 
xvi. Taisetsusan Maru (20th September 1991) 
A container ship, Taisetsusan Maru (2,894 tons) anchored at Miyako offing 
(Northeast coast of Japan) to avoid the bad weather due to coming typhoon. 
When anchoring, the chief mate who was in charge of anchor handling at 
forecastle deck did not follow normal procedure of securing anchor chain. 
Although he applied its brake, he kept engaging the clutch and did not insert the 
pin for controller stopper. After a while, due to high swell and strong wind, the 
anchor chain bounded and subsequently the strong tension was taken to the 
hydraulic motor of windlass. Consequently, the motor was broken and that ship 
dragged the anchor leeward. Finally, Taisetsusan Maru collided with the other 
vessel, whose hull was damaged and whose crew got injured when they 
abandoned (Marine Accidents Inquiry Association, 1994). 
 
xvii. Daishowa Maru (11th February 1992) 
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A wood-chip carrier, Daishowa Maru (48,566 tons) was anchored at Twofold Bay 
offing, the south coast of Australia. Although the weather was getting severer, 
the master did not decide to leave her anchorage to offshore. He had been well 
advised that his watch officers kept a close anchor watch. The watch officer (3rd 
mate) neglected to fix her position and detected the anchor dragged late. The 
relieved watch officer confirmed the ship shifted from original position. The 
master was called and the engine was stood by. The master ordered to heave up 
anchor with full-ahead engine. The tension of the chain was very tight and the 
windlass could not cope. Consequently, the ship was grounded (Cahill, 2002).  
  
xviii. Korean Shipper (12th October 1994) 
A semi-container, Korean Shipper anchored at Jinhae Bay, South Korea with full 
load condition. The typhoon was approaching at that time. The ship was aground 
due to strong wind and high swell. The cause of the accident was 1) negligence 
of the OOW on proper anchor watch, 2) late notification to the master on 
dragging anchor, 3) the master‟s mischoice of anchorage taken into account on 
loading condition, 4) lack of consideration of ship‟s draft against wind pressure 
and 5) improper operation on anchor handling (KMST, 1995). 
 
xix. U.K. flagged Ro-ro Passenger ferry (1st March 1995) 
A ro-ro passenger ferry, XX (18,523 tons) was carrying out the anchor operation 
in a harbour area under strong weather. Crew member (Deck ratings: Age 
20-24) lost grip of windlass brake and struck gypsy guard. His grip was lost when 
another crew member attempted to speed up operation by assisting first crew 
member in his efforts to release the brake. Second crew member did not 
appreciate potential consequence of his actions. The first crew member got 
bruising injury. The cause of this accident was an issue on the working methods 
(MAIB, 2010). 
 
xx. Panamanian Oil Tanker (1st January 1998) 
An oil tanker, XX (17,134 tons) anchored with pilot onboard at Torbay, the United 
Kingdom. The master received a weather forecast indicating the on-shore wind 
would increase to gale force. He ordered the OOWs to call him and engineer 
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officer when they suspected the ship was dragging anchor. After a while, the 
wind force reached to 9 and the OOW plotted her position and confirmed her 
dragging as he became aware the vessel was moving. The master came up to 
the bridge and he ordered to heave up anchor. However, due to the severe 
weather, the cable could not be shortened despite using full power on the 
engines to help. The ship continued to drag and grounded. There was no 
pollution and there were no injuries, yet this ship suffered the bottom damage 
(MAIB, 2010). 
 
xxi. No.18 Kinko Maru (10th January 1999) 
A product oil tanker, No.18 Kinko Maru (695 tons) was sailing in the passage 
toward her berth in port of Yokkaichi, Japan. Only first mate was standing at 
forward station. However, in spite of the stand-by condition, he left forward 
mooring deck briefly in order to take his jacket to his room without putting the 
controller stopper and no notice to the bridge. Subsequently, the applying power 
of the windlass brake was not enough and spontaneously the anchor chain was 
walked back. As a result, the submarine cable which was laid down on the 
seabed was hooked by the anchor and was destroyed (Marine Accidents Inquiry 
Association, 2001). 
 
xxii. Ever Sea (19th March 1999) 
A Panamanian general cargo vessel, Ever Sea (4,480 tons) anchored at Pohang 
offing, South Korea. The master did not obtain the weather forecast. The ship 
was aground without any engine use due to strong wind and high swell. The 
cause of the accident was 1) lack of weather information, 2) misuse of engine 
and improper operation of anchor handling (KMST, 2000). 
 
xxiii. Happy Lady (21st January 2001) 
A liquid petroleum gas (LPG) carrier, Happy Lady (6,107 tons) anchored at the 
designated anchorage in the Thames estuary. The starboard anchor cable was 
heaved up for berthing. At that time, no officer was on the forecastle (Chief mate 
came late to the forecastle deck) and cable leading was on the port bow. Then 
cable became trapped between the bulbous bow and the stem on several 
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occasions. The cable leadings was not informed to the bridge properly (lack of 
communication) and The master attempted to clear the cable by maneuvering 
the vessel, yet the anchor dragged in the strong wind (Lee shore situation). 
Consequently this ship grounded on soft mud on a falling tide (MAIB, 2001).  
 
xxiv. Willy (1st January 2002) 
A product oil tanker, Willy (3,070 tons) anchored at Cawsand Bay, the United 
Kingdom. The ship was exposed to strong south easterly wind with pitching due 
to her light condition and the swell (Lee shore situation). At that time, the amount 
of cable used was insufficient given the prevailing weather conditions, depth of 
water, nature of the seabed and condition of the ship. The OOW did not detect 
the ship‟s movement and the anchor dragged immediately (improper anchor 
watch) and then the master was not informed until about seven minutes after the 
anchor had started to drag. Furthermore, the OOW did not start the main engine 
until the master ordered, yet the engine could not be started and there was not 
sufficient time to avoid the danger. The master did not consider paying out the 
additional cable to stop anchor from dragging. Eventually this ship grounded. No 
one injured (MAIB, 2002).  
 
xxv. Cope Venture (25th July 2002) 
A panamax type bulk carrier, Cope Venture (36,080 tons) left her birth in port of 
Shibushi, Japan due to approaching the typhoon and expected to be severe 
weather. The master decided to anchor just off the port. He was told that this 
area was not good area to evacuate from typhoon because this area in Shibushi 
Bay is opening to the Pacific Ocean. It meant the swell would be coming directly 
from typhoon. As typhoon approaching, the wind and swell became bigger. The 
master let the chief mate station on the forecastle and let report the cable 
leadings as the engine was been using in order not to drag anchor. In despite of 
the effort, the ship started to drag the anchor. Then the master decided to heave 
up anchor but it was impossible to do it due to strong wind and high swell. As a 
result, the ship was grounded and four crew members died when they evacuated 
from the ship (Marine Accidents Inquiry Association, 2003). 
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xxvi. No. 1 & No. 2 Haedong Ho (12th September 2003) 
A combined pusher barge, No. 1 & No. 2 Haedong Ho was anchored under 
severe weather due to approaching typhoon. That ship was dragging anchor and 
approached to a training ship H. The master of the training ship recognized a 
danger and noticed to No. 1 & No. 2 Haedong Ho to avoid a collision through 
VHF He asked to keep enough distance from the ship and noticed an awareness 
of being dragging of No. 1 & No. 2 Haedong Ho. No. 1 Haedong Ho replied that 
the ship was not under command due to out of order of the port side engine. In 
order to avoid collision, the training ship was requested to keep distance from No. 
1 & No. 2 Haedong Ho by using engine ahead to passing on the stern side of the 
training ship and veering out anchor cable more than before. At that time, the 
wind was extremely gain strength, from 23-33 m/s to 44-46 m/s. Subsequently, 
No.1 & 2 Haedong Ho failed to control ship‟s engine and collided with the 
training ship. The cause of the accident was losing anchor holding power and 
dragging anchor under heavy weather. In addition, No.1 & 2 Haedong Ho 
committed operational negligence and lack of positive action in advance of 
dragging anchor. Even after finding dragging anchor, ship was not fully prepared 
to prevent collision through all available means appropriately in the 
circumstances and conditions (KMST, 2005). 
 
xxvii. Ace (21st September 2003) 
A general cargo vessel, Ace (16,143 tons) anchored at Pusan offing, South 
Korea. The master left the ship temporarily and the relieved master was 
commanding the ship during anchoring. The OOW had an improper anchor 
watch such as no anchor watch personnel on the bridge and not fixing anchor 
position. As the OOW did not notice the anchor dragged, the ship was aground 
although the engine was stand-by and was used. The cause of the accident was 
1) the relieved master‟s negligence on proper command, 2) improper anchor 
watch, 3) the insufficient length of anchor chain in the water and 4) lack of safety 
management system of operating company (KMST, 2004). 
 
xxviii. Sunflower Kirishima (9th October 2003) 
A ro-ro car ferry, Sunflower Kirishima (12,418 tons) was sailing in the coast off 
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Shikoku, Japan. Due to the rough sea condition, the starboard anchor and its all 
chain (300m) were dropped into the sea and the anchor could not be hove up by 
windlass power. Consequently, the schedule of the ship was delayed. The 
causes were 1) a damage of the pin for controller stopper due to its modification 
and rough sea condition, 2) the severed wire stopper due to using less diameter 
wire for convenient work, 3) inadequate applying power for windlass brake and 
4) inadequate safety education for the operation company (Marine Accidents 
Inquiry Association, 2004). 
 
xxix. No.18 Seifuku Maru (22nd March 2004) 
A product oil tanker, No. 18 Seifuku Maru (199 tons) anchored at Oita offing, 
Japan. The low pressure system was approaching to that area. At that time, 
strong wind and high wave were expected according to the weather information. 
However, as the master understood this vessel had never dragged her anchor 
under the condition, he did not pay attention to the anchor bearings. Furthermore, 
as he did not obtain the correct weather information, he did not pay out the 
additional anchor chain into the water. When he made round the ship, he felt 
unusual shock. He found the vessel was dragging the anchor. He tried to use the 
engine and order the anchor operation. Consequently, the ship was aground 
(Marine Accidents Inquiry Association, 2005). 
 
xxx. No.28 Matsushima Maru (7th September 2004) 
A general cargo vessel, No. 28 Matsushima Maru (455 tons) anchored at Saiki 
offing, Japan in order to evacuate from the approaching typhoon. The OOW 
detected the anchor was dragged due to strong wind. The master decided to 
drop her anchor at another position because the lee shore was very close. The 
ship anchored again with both anchors, yet the distance to another anchoring 
vessel was close. The master decided heave up the anchors again and he 
ordered to heave up both anchors at the same time. Subsequently, although the 
ship was using her engine, the blackout was taken place. Consequently, the ship 
dragged her anchors and collided with the anchoring vessel (Marine Accidents 
Inquiry Association, 2005). 
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xxxi. Kaiwo Maru (20th October 2004) 
A sail training ship, Kaiwo-Maru (2,556 tons) anchored at Toyama offing, Japan. 
The master decided to continue to anchor there although the strong typhoon was 
coming (Lee shore situation). As the wind and swell was getting severer and 
severer, the master decided to pick up anchor and to evacuate to offshore. By 
the way, the winding power of the windlass was not enough under the severe 
weather although the engines were used. Subsequently the anchor could not be 
hove up and the ship has no choice. Finally it dragged anchor and ran aground. 
As a result the ship hit with the break water and the hull and all the part of ship 
were damaged. Fortunately no one was killed, yet 29 people injured. The causes 
of this accident were 1) miss-choice of an anchorage, 2) missing of an 
opportunity to evacuate, 3) lack of supporting framework from operating institute 
(Marine Accidents Inquiry Association, 2005). 
 
xxxii. Marine Osaka (13th November 2004) 
A general cargo ship, Marine Osaka (5,565 tons) anchored at Ishikari offing, 
Hokkaido, Japan. Due to the strong wind and high wave, the ship dragged its 
anchor. In spite of picking up its anchor, the ship drifted and hit to the break 
water because the propulsion power was not be enough due to bad weather. 
Subsequently, the ship was broken into three parts and sank. As a result, seven 
crew including master was killed because of the drowning. The causes of this 
accident were 1) wind pressure was big due to ballast condition, 2) inadequate 
anchor chain length in the water and 3) improper anchor watch and late 
recognition of the dragging anchor (Marine Accidents Inquiry Association, 2005). 
 
xxxiii. POLO M (23rd November 2004) 
A bulk carrier, POLO M (21,630 tons) anchored at Gotland offing, Sweden for 
loading her cargo. The intense low pressure system was passing through that 
area. The OOW detected the ship was dragging due to strong wind (10-11 BF). 
Despite of using engine, the anchor chain was not able to be heaved up due to 
tight chain. Consequently, the ship was aground. The cause of this accident was 
the strong wind and the inadequate fixing of anchor position (SMSI, 2005). 
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xxxiv. UK flagged tanker (16th December 2005) 
A tanker, XX (16,754 tons) was sailing in high seas. The ship encountered heavy 
weather with heavy rolling and pitching. Then the starboard anchor wire stopper 
broke due to rough sea condition and the starboard anchor went slack as the 
windlass brake was weak. Consequently the anchor strongly impacted the hull 
and caused penetration cracks and dents. The causes of this accident were 1) 
the windlass brake had not been properly adjusted, 2) the anchor holding wire 
strop was not the correct size and not strong enough and 3) anchor chain 
compressor bar (stopper) was not fitting correctly with the pin not applied. The 
manager also identified that poor seamanship and lack of attention to duty along 
with a failure of the planned maintenance system (windlass brake adjustment 
and wrong wire strop fitted) were causes of this incident (MAIB, 2010). 
 
xxxv. U.K. flagged container (2nd January 2006) 
A container vessel was planning to anchor at an anchorage off Genoa, Italy. The 
depth of water was 59m. The master ordered to let go anchor after standing by 
at 2 shackles on deck walked back. After letting go the anchor, the master was 
reported 6 shackles were on deck. Subsequently, the master ordered the cable 
veered out to 7 shackles on deck. However, the anchor chain was veered out to 
the bitter end and the anchor chain was lost. 
The cause of this accident was due to poor marking of the cable (marked 
correctly but not clearly), pins securing the bitter end was not enough to hold the 
cable (MAIB, 2010). 
 
xxxvi. Bermuda flagged ro-ro passenger ferry (30th April 2006) 
A ro-ro passenger ferry, XX (10,957 tons) was in the process of anchoring at 
Northern Irish offing under the calm sea condition. The AB was ordered to apply 
the brake as the cable was veering out very quickly. However the AB loosened 
the brake further in error and the cable took charge. The cable eventually 
reached to the bitter end and pulled free from the chain locker and fell into the 
sea. The cause of the accident was inadequate training of the AB and lack of 
communication or co-ordination (MAIB, 2010). 
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xxxvii. Thunder (9th August 2006) 
A general cargo ship, Thunder (1,559 tons) anchored in the Wild Road 
anchorage off the port of Mostyn, the United Kingdom. Three shackles of cable 
were veered in 24m of water. The wind was gusting to 29 knots and a tidal 
stream of 2.5 knots was running. The vessel dragged her anchor overnight and 
then grounded. The causes of the accident were 1) Improper anchor watch by 
OOW, 2) Insufficient length of the anchor cable veered in the water, 3) No action 
in despite of the situation under BF 6 and strong tidal stream, 4) This ship did not 
have an appropriate chart (MAIB, 2006).  
 
xxxviii. Bahamas flagged Aframax crude oil carrier (13th August 2006) 
A crude oil carrier, XX (62,929 tons) anchored at Tees Bay, the United Kingdom. 
Although it was severe weather condition (Wind Force 7-9), this ship could not 
move from the anchorage due to hydraulic failure of windlass. The ship needed 
to call the service engineer and the necessary spares and needed to use her 
engines to maintain her position. The ship completed repairs with outside 
assistance and started to sail without further incident (MAIB, 2010). 
 
xxxix. Giant Step (6th October 2006) 
A bulk carrier, Giant Step (98,587 tons) anchored at Kashima offing, Japan. The 
severe weather was expected because typhoon was approaching at that time. 
As the wind was getting severer, the master decided to pick up anchor to 
evacuate to offshore. However, the anchor could not be picked up due to the 
leakage of hydraulic oil of windlass. While immediately the part was repaired, the 
ship was dragging anchor. The captain tried to use engine to prevent drifting. 
Eventually, the engine was stopped due to scavenge fire by high loading 
operation. The master ordered the chief mate to cut the anchor chain to sail 
because the anchor cable could not be hove up due to high wind and rough sea. 
Although the anchor chain was cut, the ship was drifting leeward because the 
engine power was inadequate. Finally, the ship ran aground and was broken into 
two parts. As a result, eight were killed and two were missing (Marine Accidents 
Inquiry Association, 2007). 
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xl. BRO ATLAND (20th January 2007) 
An oil and chemical tanker, BRO ATLAND (11,377 tons) was anchoring. When 
the anchor was picked up, the green seas washed off the mooring deck due to 
high swell. Chief mate got the wave and drifted. He got injury. Obviously, this 
incident was due to human factor (Swedish Transport Agency, 2010). 
 
xli. U.K. flagged container (2nd March 2007) 
A Panamax container, XX (51,931 tons) was sailing for Harwich, the United 
Kingdom. That vessel lost the anchor on its way in the port area. The cause of 
this accident was failure of a windlass brake due to maintenance issues (MAIB, 
2010).  
 
xlii. Young Lady (25th June 2007) 
A crude oil tanker, Young Lady (56,204 tons) anchored at Tees Bay, east coast of 
the United Kingdom. As the weather condition got severer, the ship stared to 
drag her anchor. The master decided to weigh anchor and depart. However 
during the operation, the windlass hydraulic motor exploded and the cable ran 
out to the bitter end due to high tension of the chain. The ship continued to drag 
when passing over gas pipe line. Consequently, the anchor flukes snagged the 
pipe. Fortunately, no one injured and there was no pollution. The cause of this 
accident is that the master was aware that the anchorage was not recommended 
in the forecast conditions and the decision to remain at anchor was inappropriate 
(MAIB, 2008). 
 
xliii. Astral (10th March 2008) 
A chemical and oil tanker, Astral anchored at Nab Anchorage, south coast of the 
United Kingdom. The weather deteriorated as the wind increased to BF 10 and 
this ship started to drag (Lee shore situation). OOW informed to the master and 
requested the main engine ready. Then the master came up to the bridge and 
dispatched the anchor party forward. The master tried to use the engine in order 
not to drag. In despite of their effort, this ship continued to drag to shore and 
grounded on the Princessa Shoal. No one injured, yet the there was structural 
damage for rudder, steering gear and hull. The causes of this accident were 1) 
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inappropriate action by OOW and 2) insufficient time for main engine readiness 
(Swedish Accident Investigation Board, 2008). 
 
xliv. Liberia flagged bulk carrier (4th October 2008) 
A bulk carrier, XX (86,192 tons) was to anchor at off Immingham, the United 
Kingdom. The sea condition was very rough with wind gusting 7 to 9 in force. 
The vessel walked back 5 shackles and the windlass hydraulic motor 
disintegrated. Subsequently, the anchor cable rapidly ran out. The crew 
managed to arrest the running anchor cable at 8 shackles using the windlass 
brake and bow stopper. Due to the damage to the windlass, this ship was not 
able to heave up the anchor. The crew slipped the anchor at 8 shackles and 
attached two buoys to allow recovery when leaving the anchorage. The cause of 
this accident seems to be a machinery failure but MAIB analyzed the human 
factor is also involved due to anchoring under the severe weather (MAIB, 2010). 
 
xlv. Bahamas flagged chemical tanker (15th January 2009) 
A chemical tanker, XX (27,997 tons) anchored at Welsh offing. The master 
decided to heave up her anchor and drift till the weather abated. The cable 
slipped on the gypsy due to a heavy swell which caused the windlass to seize up. 
The ship could not heave or lower the cable and the master decided to continue 
to anchor (MAIB, 2010). 
 
xlvi. Stella Voyager (23rd March 2009) 
An oil tanker, Stella Voyager (58,088 tons) anchored at Tees Bay, east coast of 
the United Kingdom with starboard anchor. As the wind was getting stronger, the 
master decided to heave up the anchor. However, the tension of the chain was 
very strong it was hard to heave up the chain under the strong wind. Suddenly, 
the hydraulic motor was exploded although the safety devices were equipped 
and the bosun, who was operator, got a serious injury with a large fragment of 
the hydraulic motor (MAIB, 2009). While the cause of this accident is a 
catastrophic failure of the windlass and might not be related to the human factor, 
this happened under unusual situation (strong wind and high swell). 
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xlvii. Canada flagged FPSO (15th September 2009) 
A FPSO, XX (108,222 tons) was sailing in the UK waters. It is noticed that the 
anchor had become slack in the hawse pipe. Crew were instructed to heave in 
and secure anchor, but operator failed to engage the clutch on the windlass 
before loosening the brake. Anchor and cable were lost overboard. This cause 
was the windlass operator‟s error (MAIB, 2010). 
 
 
2.2 Research in Japan 
 
In 2004, 10 typhoons hit Japan and 35 crew were killed or missing as a result. 
The number of landings in 2004 was the worst ever recorded in Japan. 
 
In 2005, the Japan Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (MAIA) (present: JMAT and 
Japan Transport Safety Board) made a questionnaire research on the evacuation 
from the typhoons and collected these from 871 domestic vessels of over 100 tons. 
When the typhoon came, the number of anchoring vessels which sheltered from the 
typhoons was 690. The 122 vessels among the 279 vessels which used the main 
engine dragged their anchor. This means 43% of the vessels used the main engine. 
Fortunately, these vessels did not result in any accident while those anchors were 
being dragged. The masters of these vessels managed to control the ships well by 
keeping a strict anchor watch such as fixing the position frequently and detecting the 
dragging of the anchor immediately (MAIA, 2005). 
 
 
2.3 Statistics and analysis in the UK 
 
MAIB mentioned in an accident report that there have been 18 accidents in UK 
waters that are related to vessels dragging their anchor and subsequently 
groundings since 1992. A further 14 hazardous incidents have been recorded that 
these vessels were dragging their anchor but did not go aground. In addition to the 
statistics, MAIB remarked that the key factors to the groundings were 1) choice of 
anchorage, 2) the cable length veered in the water, 3) weather conditions and 4) 
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main engine readiness (MAIB, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, MAIB (2006, p.28) analyzed that almost all accidents where the 
vessels subsequently grounded had some common contributory factors as follows: 
 
 The anchorage had often been chosen against the master‟s better judgment, given 
the prevailing or the forecast weather conditions and the proximity of a lee shore. 
 In many cases the scope of the cable in the given depth of water was substantially 
less than the minimum recommended. 
 Only when the OOW had determined that the vessel was dragging, was an attempt 
made to veer more cable. Several groundings would probably have been avoided 
had the master thoroughly assessed the forecast weather and veered more cable 
before the vessel started dragging. 
 The amount of cable used might not have been sufficient in itself to prevent a 
vessel dragging, but in many of the cases the main machinery notice of readiness 
was inadequate for the crew to deal promptly with the consequence once the 
vessel began to drag. 
 On several occasions, monitoring of the vessel‟s position within its predicted 
swinging circle was inadequate, and therefore did not provide early warning to the 
OOW that the anchor had begun to drag. 
 
 
2.4 Summary of cases 
 
To summarize the cases, 39 of 47 the accident cases mentioned in 2.1.1 above 
happened during severe weather. Especially significant is that the ships tried to 
heave up the anchor after detecting the dragging anchor but this seemed to be 
impossible due to the heavy tension of the chain, according to the investigation 
report.  
 
 
2.5 Meteorological Statistics and Prediction 
 
Global warming has been focused on in recent years, mainly derived from the 
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emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). Global warming makes a serious impact on the 
environmental side effects. Reducing CO2 is an urgent task for all industry including 
shipping. However, climate change is not to be ignored for ship‟s operation. In this 
section, climate change and the future prediction made by the Japan Agency on for 
Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) on wind force is referred to. In 
fact, ships at anchor are influenced by wind force although the current and the wave 
(swell) are also contributed. In particular, the meteorological statistics in Japan, as a 
sample of peak gusts which Japan Meteorological Agency has issued, has been 
analyzed. 
 
2.5.1 Climate change at sea – cases in Japan 
The Japan Meteorological Agency publishes the weather statistics on its web 
site (http://www.jma.go.jp). According to the data, the statistics on peak gusts 
have been collected randomly from several points in Japan. Sampling is mainly 
from coastal weather stations and covers all regions in Japan as in Fig. 1. Totally, 
the statistics of 21 points of peak gusts in the year are collected from 1967 to 
2009 (some of them are not available) and plotted in the following figures (see 
Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4). Furthermore, in order to analyze the statistics and to 
observe the trend, the linearization is overlaid on each figure. To draw 
linearization on each graph, the Microsoft Excel function was used. As a 
reference, the raw data is shown in Annex I. 
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①Wakkanai 
②Nemuro 
③Aomori 
④Miyako 
⑤Sakata 
⑥Niigata 
⑦Onahama 
⑧Choshi 
⑨Izu O Shima 
Chichishima➉ 
⑪Omaesaki 
⑫Fushiki 
⑬Shiono Misaki 
⑭Matsue 
⑯Murotozaki 
⑰Shimmonoseki Izuhara⑱ 
⑲Miyazaki 
⑮Hiroshima 
⑳Tanegashima 
○21 Minami Daito Shima 
Remarks: Numbers show the places of the weather stations. 
Fig. 1  Distribution of the sampling weather stations, Japan 
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 Fig. 2  Peak gusts at weather stations in Japan from 1967 to 2009 and linearization – part 1 
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8. Choshi
 26 
 
 
 Fig. 3  Peak gusts at weather stations in Japan from 1967 to 2009 and linearization – part 2 
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9. Izu O shima
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16. Murotozaki
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According to the linearization of the figures mentioned above, at 18 of 21 points 
the trend of the peak gust is increasing year by year. However, the trend of 3 of 
21 points (Murotozaki, Wakkanai and Shimonoseki) has declined. This means 
the weather condition, especially wind speed, has been getting more severe. 
There are several areas which have suffered from tropical cyclones. Obviously 
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20. Tanegashima
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21. Minami Daito Shima
Fig. 4  Peak gusts at weather stations in Japan from 1967 to 2009 and linearization – part 3 
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Japan is no exception, yet the seasonal low pressure systems may be getting 
more severe and influences there. 
 
2.5.2 Future prediction on the generation of tropical cyclone 
According to the fourth assessment report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007), it is reported that the number of tropical 
cyclones will be decreasing due to global warming at the end of the 21st century, 
but their intense category will be increasing. The credibility of this report is, 
nonetheless, not high at that moment. 
 
The Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) and 
the University of Tokyo have made a simulation experiment by using a super 
computer named Earth Simulator where they proved the above prediction in the 
IPCC-AR4 in April 2010. According to the report, the frequency of the maximum 
wind of the tropical cyclone and minimum sea level pressure will change as 
shown in Fig. 5. The CTL shows the data derived from an experiment on the 
current climate and the GW (Global Warming) shows future predictions under 
global warming (http://jamstec.go.jp/e/about/press_release/20100422). 
 
 
Source: JAMSTEC 
Fig. 5  Comparison between current and future prediction on tropical cyclone 
 
In the future, it is predicted that the frequency percentile of more than 55m/sec in 
maximum wind speed is approximately 29% compared with approximately 2% in 
the current situation. In addition, according to the figure on the right, it is found 
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that a frequency percentile of less than 900hPa of the minimum surface pressure 
of tropical cyclone is approximately 35% compared with approximately 3% in the 
current situation. 
 
Based on this experiment, it is expected that vessels would be exposed by more 
severe winds and higher waves in the future if global warming continues to grow. 
 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the accident cases related to anchor handling have been 
introduced. In addition, the climate change effects on peak gusts in Japan have been 
researched. It is proved that the peak gust at 18 of 21 points at weather stations in 
Japan has increased. Furthermore, the research made by a research institution in 
Japan shows the significant future predictions regarding tropical cyclones. If this 
trend continues in the future, ships would be exposed to much stronger winds than in 
the past. 
 
However, in spite of a lot of serious incidents making human life hazardous and 
endangering the environment, no proper measures have been taken. In fact, despite 
the ISM code entering into force to reduce human error, serious accident cases have 
been significant in the 2000s. This is partly due to a lot of tropical cyclones 
(typhoons) that landed in Japan in 2004. 
 
Why have these things happened? Why does the windlass not heave up an 
anchor under the strong tension of the chain? What is the performance requirement 
of the anchor and anchor windlass? What is the MET requirement under the STCW 
convention regarding anchor handling? In the next chapter, the requirements of 
international regulations regarding the anchor windlass will be discussed. 
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Chapter 3. Characteristics of windlass and regulatory bases 
of education and training on anchor handling 
 
 
The regulatory bases on the anchor windlass are mentioned in this chapter 
from both the training and technical points of view. A general picture of the anchor 
windlass is mentioned followed by the regulatory basis. 
 
3.1 Characteristics of anchor windlass 
 
The anchor windlass is one item of the deck machineries which the ship uses 
for mooring, anchoring and cargo handling operations. There are several kinds of 
deck machinery on-board ships such as anchor windlass, mooring winch and deck 
crane. Mainly there are two types of deck machinery while there are other types of 
systems such as the steam powered system. One is an electric motor type and the 
other is a hydraulic motor type, although a deck crane uses hydraulic cylinders 
instead of hydraulic motors. However, the only type of motor is basically different 
between these two systems. Especially, for inflammable substance carriers such as 
oil tankers the electric motor system is not able to be equipped.  
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Fig. 6 shows a rough drawing of the anchor windlass system. This is a very 
simple machine because there are only four operation points in an anchor windlass: 
Control lever, Clutch (Gear), Brake and Stopper (Guillotine). In addition to the four 
operation points, there is a lashing device for the anchor stopper, but it is only used 
for sailing in high seas or under rough sea conditions. 
 
3.1.1 Electric motor system 
On the electric motor system, electric motors with electromagnetic brakes are 
fitted as a driving force generator. Fig. 7 shows this system. Characteristically, a 
torque limiter is equipped between the motor and main propeller shaft in order to 
release the overload. For this reason, a torque limiter needs a proper torque 
setting of mating surface periodically. Otherwise the windlass does not make the 
proper performance as the manufacturer had intended. As mentioned in Chapter 
2, the maintenance of the torque limiter may be a very important factor. 
Fig. 6  Rough sketch of anchor windlass 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the brand-new electric motor type does not have a slipping clutch. It 
has just an over current relay and similar devices to avoid the overload. This 
means that the electric motor type of windlass is free from maintenance. 
 
3.1.2 Hydraulic motor system 
In contrast, this system uses operating hydraulic oil which is pressured by 
hydraulic oil pumps. The merit of this system is that no matter what the ship‟s 
size is, it can be applied. Furthermore, it can prevent the electric spark vicinity of 
the deck machinery because the hydraulic pumps and oil tank can be located 
apart from the deck machinery. Fig. 8 shows the drawings of this system. A 
control lever can control the speed of the winding by changing the flow of 
hydraulic oil. As a difference, there is a safety device called the Counterbalance 
valve to release the overload. This is a releasing valve which prevents the rising 
of the pressure of the hydraulic oil. It is necessary to maintain the settings 
Fig. 7  Electric motor windlass 
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periodically. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Technical requirements of an anchor windlass 
 
In fact, there have been no international conventions regarding the 
requirements of the anchor and anchor windlass as hardware. IACS have decided a 
common requirement regarding the anchor and windlass among its members. For 
example, while the class NK (Nippon Kaiji Kyokai) is a recognized organization as an 
IACS member in Japan, the Japanese Government (Maritime Bureau, Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism) is also carrying out the ship‟s 
inspection and issues all the documents which are relevant to the regulations. For 
this reason, the legislation on the requirements regarding the anchor and anchor 
windlass are well established in Japan. 
 
Furthermore, the anchor windlass is the one of the compulsory equipment 
Fig. 8  Hydraulic motor windlass system 
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items on all vessels inspected by classification societies or the government as well 
as the anchors and anchor chains. There are requirements on the anchor and anchor 
windlass in the IACS requirements and recommendations (IACS, 2005) which have 
been agreed by the classification society members (see Annex II). 
 
The anchor and anchor chain are required in the above requirement in all 
classification societies. However, the anchor is equipped in order to hold under a 
wind speed of 25m/sec as an example, yet the wave drifting power is not taken into 
consideration in this requirement. As mentioned in Chapter 2, most accidents are 
caused not only by the wind and tidal stream but also by the swell. 
 
When it comes to the performance requirement of the anchor windlass, it is just 
a recommendation of IACS. This recommendation is laid down in IACS 
recommendation No.10 (see Annex III). According to this recommendation, it 
mentions that the performance of anchor windlasses is taken into account at just 
under a wind speed of 14 m/sec, a water current of 3 knots and an anchorage depth 
of 100m. This means the anchor windlass might not be able to heave the anchor 
without assistance from, for example, the main engine if the wind blows at 20m/sec. 
In addition, if maintenance is carried out improperly, performance would obviously 
decline. 
 
 
3.3 Training requirements for anchor windlass operations in the STCW 
convention and IMO Model courses 
 
Seafarer‟s competence would be obviously essential in order to prevent 
accidents or incidents along with the technical requirements. The STCW convention 
requires a training standard for seafarers at the international level. In addition to the 
convention, the STCW Code Part A is mandatory and Code Part B is a 
recommendation. The STCW convention was reviewed comprehensively in 1995 
and this revision is a current version although a smaller revision has since taken 
place. Especially, the competencies at both levels (Operational level and 
Management level) are laid down in the STCW Code A-II and A-III for deck officers 
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and engineering officers respectively. 
 
IMO Model courses are the recommendation which guides the recommended 
curriculum for MET institutions and some relevant places to implement the IMO 
conventions. Model courses 7.01, 7.02, 7.03 and 7.04 mention the curricula for the 
deck officer and engineering officer under Chapters II & III of the STCW. 
 
3.3.1 Competence requirements of the STCW 
In chapter II of the STCW and its Code, the training requirements for deck 
officers including the master are laid down. The deck department is in charge of 
the anchor handling they should have the competency for anchor handling. 
 
II/1 of the STCW requires the competencies for deck officers at the operational 
level and II/2 requires the competencies for masters and chief mates at the 
management level. However, there are some fundamental requirements for their 
competencies on anchor handling in the Code A as mandatory as shown in the 
Table 1. Here, the handling of anchor windlass and knowledge of the deck 
machinery are not mentioned.  
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Table 1  Competence Table extracted from Table A-II/2 of the STCW 78/95 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Competence 
Knowledge, understanding 
and proficiency 
Methods for 
demonstrating 
competence 
Criteria for evaluating 
competence 
Manoeuvre 
and handle a 
ship in all 
conditions 
Manoeuvring and handling a 
ship in all conditions, 
including: 
 
(omitted) 
 
9. choice of anchorage; 
anchoring with one or 
two anchors in limited 
anchorages and 
factors involved in 
determining the 
length of anchor 
cable to be used 
10. dragging anchor; 
clearing fouled 
anchors 
 
(omitted) 
 
Examination and 
assessment of evidence 
obtained from one or 
more of the following: 
1. approved in-service 
experience  
2. approved simulator 
training, where 
appropriate 
3. approved manned 
scale ship model, 
where appropriate 
All decisions 
concerning berthing 
and anchoring are 
based on a proper 
assessment of the 
ship‟s manoeuvring and 
engine characteristics 
and the forces to be 
expected while berthed 
alongside or lying at 
anchor. 
 
While under way, a full 
assessment is made of 
possible effects of 
shallow and restricted 
waters, ice, banks, tidal 
conditions, passing 
ships and own ship‟s 
bow and stern wave so 
the ship can be safely 
manoeuvred under 
various conditions of 
loading and weather. 
 
 
Next, in Chapter III of the STCW, the training requirements for the engineering 
officer are laid down. Generally, the engine department is in charge of the 
maintenance of the deck machinery. However, they do not use the deck 
machinery in their routine duties. If there is a problem with the anchor windlass, 
the deck officer would ask the engineering officer to make an inspection. In III/2 
of the STCW at the management level, there is a requirement for the 
engineering officers to have competencies on the operation and maintenance of 
deck machinery (see Table 2). 
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Table 2  Competence Table extracted from Table A-III/2 of the STCW 78/95 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Competence 
Knowledge, 
understanding and 
proficiency 
Methods for demonstrating 
competence 
Criteria for evaluating 
competence 
Operate, 
monitor and 
evaluate 
engine 
performance 
and capacity 
Practical Knowledge 
Operation and 
maintenance of : 
1. marine diesel 
engines 
2. marine steam 
propulsion plant 
3. marine gas 
turbines 
 
(omitted) 
 
Operation and 
maintenance of 
cargo handling 
equipment and deck 
machinery 
Examination and assessment of 
evidence obtained from one or 
more of the following: 
1. approved in-service 
experience  
2. approved training ship 
experience 
3. approved simulator 
training, where appropriate 
The methods of 
measuring the load 
capacity of the engines 
are in accordance with 
technical specifications 
 
Performance is 
checked against bridge 
orders 
 
Performance levels are 
in accordance with 
technical specifications 
Maintain 
safety of 
engine 
equipment, 
systems and 
services 
Examination and assessment of 
evidence obtained from one or 
more of the following: 
1. approved in-service 
experience  
2. approved training ship 
experience 
Arrangements for 
ensuring the safe and 
efficient operation and 
condition of the 
machinery installation 
are suitable for all 
modes of operation 
 
 
 
Although the engine department is not the operator of the deck machinery, those 
competencies are required in chapter III of the STCW. Generally speaking, on 
most vessels, the engine department would not be in charge of the operation of 
the deck machineries. For example, the SMS manual of the sea training institute 
in Japan which operates the five training ships lays down the roles of each 
department, which mentions that the deck department is in charge of the 
operation of the deck machineries and the engine department is in charge of 
their maintenance (NIST, 2006). 
 
 
3.3.2 Curricula in IMO Model Courses 
In the IMO Model Course 7.01 (Master and Chief Mate) which follows the 
requirement in II/2 of the STCW, the syllabus for competence of a ship‟s auxiliary 
machinery at the management level is mentioned, yet there is little content on 
the deck machinery and hydraulic systems. However, it does not mention 
training items on anchor handling (IMO, 1999a). 
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In addition, it is recommended that the allocated hour for anchor handling and 
anchor procedure is only 6 hours (1.9.1.8 anchoring) and a part of 36 hours 
(1.10.2 Ship‟s auxiliary machinery) in Model Course 7.01 to fulfill the 
requirements (ibid.). Compared with the total allocated hours (379 hours) in 
Navigation at management level, it would be so small that seafarers can not 
obtain their competencies well. If this curriculum is taking place on the training 
ship or actual seagoing service, some merchant ships are not able to have 
enough time for anchoring depending upon the type of vessel. For example, it is 
assumed that cadets or seafarers are engaged and trained on a ferry which sails 
between the ports back and forth. In this case, they may not experience 
anchoring during this service.  
 
In IMO Model Course 7.02 (Chief Engineer Officer and Second Engineer Officer) 
which follows the requirement in III/2 of the STCW, the syllabus of competence 
on operation and maintenance of cargo handling equipment and deck machinery 
at the management level is mentioned, and the items on the explanation of the 
windlass characteristics are required responding to competence table III/2 of the 
STCW Code (IMO, 1999b). 
 
In IMO Model Course 7.03 (Officer in charge of a navigational watch) which 
follows the requirement in II/1 of the STCW and 7.04 (Engineer officer in charge 
of a watch) which follows the requirement in III/1 of the STCW, no items are 
required regarding the windlass operation (IMO, 1999c) (IMO, 1999d). 
 
 
3.3.3 Future revision of the STCW 
In June 2010, the diplomatic conference to adapt amendments to the STCW 
1978 and STCW code was convened in Manila, Republic of the Philippines. The 
comprehensive review of the STCW convention and the STCW code had been 
taking place through the several annual STW sub-committee meetings and two 
intersessional meetings of the STW working group at the IMO headquarters in 
London. In Manila, the new amendment of the STCW convention was adopted 
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by member states. This convention will enter into force on 1st January 2012.  
 
In this comprehensive review of the STCW convention, the competence tables of 
the code A-III/2 (Chief engineer officer and second engineer officer) are 
completely revised to introduce mainly the concept of the Engine Room 
Resource Management (see Table 3) (IMO, 2010). The words look different 
compared with the previous competence table but the required competency on 
windlass operation is nothing different. 
 
On the other hand, the requirement of anchor handling and windlass operation 
for the deck department (Chapter II of the STCW convention) is still the same as 
previously. 
 
In addition to this amendment, it is said that the revision work of the IMO Model 
Course is being done to keep up-to-date. 
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Table 3  Competence Table extracted from Table A-III/2 of the revised STCW in 2010 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Competence 
Knowledge, 
understanding and 
proficiency 
Methods for 
demonstrating 
competence 
Criteria for evaluating 
competence 
Plan and 
schedule 
operations 
Theoretical knowledge 
 
Thermodynamics and 
heat transmission 
 
Mechanics and 
hydromechanics 
 
(omitted) 
 
Practical knowledge 
 
Start up and shut down 
main propulsion and 
auxiliary machinery, 
including associated 
systems 
 
Operating limits of 
propulsion plant 
 
The efficient operation, 
surveillance, 
performance assessment 
and maintaining safety of 
propulsion plant and 
auxiliary machinery 
 
Functions and 
mechanism of automatic 
control for main engine 
 
Functions and 
mechanism of automatic 
control for auxiliary 
machinery including but 
not limited to: 
 
1. generator 
distribution systems 
2. steam boilers 
3. oil purifier 
4. refrigeration system 
5. pumping and piping 
systems 
6. steering gear 
system 
7. cargo-handling 
equipment and 
deck machinery 
Examination and 
assessment of 
evidence obtained 
from one or more of 
the following: 
1. approved 
in-service 
experience 
2. approved 
training ship 
experience 
3. approved 
simulator 
training, where 
appropriate 
4. approved 
laboratory 
equipment 
training 
The planning and preparation of 
operations is suited to the design 
parameters of the power 
installation and to the 
requirements of the voyage 
Operation, 
surveillance, 
performance 
assessment 
and 
maintaining 
safety of 
propulsion 
plant and 
auxiliary 
machinery 
Examination and 
assessment of 
evidence obtained 
from one or more of 
the following: 
1. approved 
in-service 
experience 
2. approved 
training ship 
experience 
3. approved 
simulator 
training, where 
appropriate 
4. approved 
laboratory 
equipment 
training 
The methods of preparing for the 
start-up and of making available 
fuels, lubricants, cooling water 
and air are the most appropriate 
 
Checks of pressures, 
temperatures and revolutions 
during the start-up and warmup 
period are in accordance with 
technical specifications and 
agreed work plans 
 
Surveillance of main 
propulsion plant and auxiliary 
systems is sufficient to maintain 
safe operating conditions 
 
The methods of preparing the 
shutdown and of supervising the 
cooling down of the engine are 
the most appropriate 
 
The methods of measuring the 
load capacity of the engines are 
in accordance with technical 
specifications 
 
Performance is checked against 
bridge orders 
 
Performance levels are in 
accordance with technical 
specifications 
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When those requirements which are mentioned above were established, it would 
be thought it is a sufficient standard for anchor handling competence. However, 
the global climate has changed obviously as mentioned in Chapter 2. Under the 
current situation, accidents regarding anchor handling may continue to happen. 
Nowadays, this issue becomes inevitable.  
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the characteristics of anchor windlass, the technical 
requirements of anchor windlass and training requirement in the STCW convention 
have been considered. The existing requirements and recommendations of IACS do 
not have a legal binding force. In addition, the STCW requirement and the 
recommendation in the IMO Model Courses do not seem to be enough to prevent 
anchoring operation accidents occurring. What requirements should be necessary on 
this matter? In the next chapter, the counter measures will be analyzed. 
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Chapter 4. Application of the analytical method to the 
accident cases 
 
 
4.1 Classification by using 5-M of accidents factors 
 
The accidents mentioned in Chapter 2 are classified by the 5-M of accident 
factors. The 5-M stands for Man, Machine, Medium (Environment), Management and 
Mission. This classification has been developed within the aviation branch. In the 
beginning, T. P. Wright of Cornell University introduced the 3-M - man, machine, 
environment (medium) triad during the late 1940‟s. The forth M, Management was 
introduced in 1965 at the University of Southern California. The Mission factor was 
introduced in 1976 by E. A. Jerome (Wells, 2004). These 5-Ms are interrelated with 
each other as shown in Fig. 9.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9  Diagram of the 5-M of accident factors 
Man 
Machine Medium 
Mission 
Management 
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The 5-M is able to be applied in the other fields such as marine accidents cases. 
Although 5-M is still a broad classification, its breakdown was applied in this analysis. 
As these accident factors are widely used in accident investigations, the accident 
investigation of Kaiwo Maru done by NIST in 2005 also applied this classification 
method (NIST, 2005). The breakdown of the category which is classified in the 
analysis is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4  Classification of accidents factors based on 5-M 
Main category 
Assortment 
Number 
Sub-category 
Category 1: Man 1.1 Misjudgment and mishandling 
1.2 Bad relationship among crew (teamwork) 
1.3 Miscommunication 
1.4 Improper command and orders 
Category 2: Machine 2.1 Defect of design 
2.2 Lack of maintenance 
2.3 Lack of ergonomics consideration 
Category 3: Medium (Environment) 3.1 Improper work & working environment 
3.2 Defect on Man-machine interface 
3.3 Severe weather conditions 
3.4 Inadequate information from outside 
Category 4: Management 4.1 Lack of safety awareness of management personnel 
4.2 Lack of leadership 
4.3 Ill-preparedness of the governing organization 
4.4 Ill-preparedness of manuals 
4.5 Lack of education & training 
Category 5: Mission 5.1 Extreme schedule 
5.2 Loyalty for duty 
5.3 Face (honor) 
 
 
These elements (sub-category) were applied to all the accident cases 
mentioned in Chapter 2 and checked one-by-one as to whether each element 
corresponded or not. This work has been done by the group. The members have 
approximately 7 to 9 years of sea-going experience with a master mariner certificate 
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laid down in Chapter II/2 of the STCW convention. 
 
 
4.2 Analysis by using the Quantification method type III 
 
Quantification is that the qualitative data is converted to quantitative data. 
Obviously, even if the data is descriptive, such as free opinions in the questionnaire, 
it may be difficult to analyze the qualitative data. 
 
The Quantification method type III is the one of multivariate analyses. This 
method is the same as the factor analysis or the principle component analysis based 
on the category data, which is qualitative and does not have external criteria (Ohsumi, 
2006). For example, if the data is like “sweet or salty” or “hot or cold” (there is 
external criteria), this method is not able to be applied. This Quantification method 
type III has almost the same characteristics as Correspondence analysis. 
 
While there are six types of quantification methods, four of them (types I, II, III 
and IV) have been commonly used. The Quantification method was established by 
Japanese professor, Dr. Chikio Hayashi before Correspondence analysis was 
invented by Benzécri of France (Ohsumi, 2004). 
 
In this research, the method was applied to the classification of the accident 
data by using the element mentioned in Table 4. 
 
4.2.1 Concept of Quantification method type III 
It is necessary to explain the concept of Quantification method type III by using a 
simple example in order to apply this method in this research. The concept is the 
following (Hasegawa, 2004). 
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Table 5  Sample Matrix of five responses 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 
X1 0 1 0 
X2 1 0 1 
X3 0 1 1 
 
The data are given by the responses using 1 or 0 (see Table 5). The point of “1” 
means the responses. There are five responses. In this case, Xi is called Sample 
and Yi is called Category. The five responses are (X1, Y2), (X2, Y1), (X2, Y3), (X3, 
Y2) and (X3, Y3).  
In the beginning, the order of Xi and Yi need to be changed so that the 
correlation between Xi and Yi can be maximal. The correlation can be calculated 
as the following formula. 
 
                
             
                 
 
         
 
As the values of Xi and Yi are a relative number, there is no problem to define 
that the means of X and Y are 0 and the variances are 1 as follows: 
 
      
  
         
    
  
         
    
            
 
According to the above definition, as the total number of data is five, the 
following formula is worked out. 
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Next, the correlation is calculated so as to be the maximum under the above 
condition. 
 
                               [Sample score] 
                               [Category score] 
 
When the condition is like X and Y as shown above, the correlation is a 
maximum as follows; 
        
 
X and Y are changed in ascending order as follows; 
 
                                 
                                  
 
The following matrix as a permutation is obtained according to the calculation 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 6  Permutation matrix 
 Y1 Y3 Y2 
X2 1 1 0 
X3 0 1 1 
X1 0 0 1 
 
However, when applying the quantification method type III, the two-dimensional 
scatter diagram is necessary to interpret the result. This means it is essential to 
calculate one more score of X and Y.  
In this case, the other scores are defined as (X‟1, Y‟2), (X‟2, Y‟1), (X‟2, Y‟3), (X‟3, 
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Y‟2) and (X‟3, Y‟3). Here, X‟ and Y‟ must be uncorrelated with the first X and Y. 
The calculation is the same process. 
 
4.2.2 Application of the Quantification method type III to anchor handling 
accidents 
As far as the application of the quantification method type III is concerned, 
software was used in this analysis. That is the add-in software of Microsoft Excel, 
“Excel Statistics 2006” published by Social Survey Research Information Co., 
Ltd, Japan (SSRI). The quantification method type III was applied by using the 
accident cases as Sample and the classification shown in Table 4 as Category. 
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Table 7  Counting of responses of each Category in 47 accident cases 
Category 
Counting of 
Responding  
1. Man 1.1 Misjudgment & Mishandling 41 
1.2 Bad relationship between crew (teamwork) 9 
1.3 Miscommunication 7 
1.4 Improper command and orders 23 
2. Machine 2.1 Defect of design 4 
2.2 Lack of maintenance 8 
3. Medium 
(Environment) 
3.1 Improper work & working environment 14 
3.3 Severe weather conditions 39 
3.4 Inadequate information from outside 6 
4. Management 4.1 Lack of safety awareness of management personnel 38 
4.2 Lack of leadership 3 
4.3 ill-preparedness of the governing organization 10 
4.4 Ill-preparedness of manuals 2 
4.5 Lack of education & training 32 
5. Mission 5.2 Loyalty for duty 1 
 
 
 
Fig. 10  Counting of responses of each Category in 47 accident cases 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
41
9
7
23
4
8
14
39
6
38
3
10
2
32
1
 49 
 
Table 8  Characteristic Number, Contribution Rate and Correlation Coefficient 
 
Characteristic 
Number 
Contribution 
Rate 
Accumulate 
Contribution 
Rate 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Tendency 1 0.3063 17.86% 17.86% 0.5535 
Tendency 2 0.2196 12.81% 30.67% 0.4686 
 
According to Table 8, although the correlation coefficient is not high, this would 
be the reason that all the accident cases such as grounding, collision and losing 
the anchor have been analyzed. If only similar cases are analyzed, this 
correlation coefficient would be higher. 
 
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 show Category plot and Sample plot respectively. Table 9 and 
Table 10 show the raw data of Category plot and Sample plot respectively. As a 
characteristic of the quantification method type III, there is the same tendency on 
each axis of both Category plot and Sample plot (Hasegawa, 2004).  
 
According to Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, Tendency 1 would mean the degree of 
technical element because „2.2 Lack of maintenance‟ and „2.1 Defect of design‟ 
are plotted at a high score and „4.2 Lack of leadership‟ is plotted at a low score. 
In Fig.12 (Sample plot), the accidents on the mechanical failure are plotted at a 
high score (ix, xxxv, xlvi) 
 
On the other hand, regarding Tendency 2 in Category plot, only „4.4 
Ill-preparedness of manuals‟ is plotted at a high score and only „4.2 Lack of 
leadership‟ is plotted at a low score. Although it is difficult to determine the 
tendency, Tendency 2 would mean the degree of management factor. 
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Fig. 11  Category plot from Quantification method type III 
 
 
Table 9  Category score from Quantification method type III 
Category Tendency 1 Tendency 2 
1.1 Misjudgment & Mishandling -0.2396 -0.0678 
1.2 Bad relationship between crew (teamwork) -0.6701 -0.6400 
1.3 Miscommunication -0.8123 -0.3268 
1.4 Improper command and orders -0.3435 -0.0966 
2.1 Defect of design 3.1783 0.5004 
2.2 Lack of maintenance 4.4180 -0.8614 
3.1 Improper work & working environment -0.3053 1.9888 
3.3 Severe weather conditions 0.0750 0.1303 
3.4 Inadequate information from outside 0.9912 -0.3446 
4.1 Lack of safety awareness of management personnel -0.2780 -0.5121 
4.2 Lack of leadership -1.8442 -5.6111 
4.3 Ill-preparedness of the governing organization 0.4318 0.4804 
4.4 Ill-preparedness of manuals -0.8380 5.4507 
4.5 Lack of education & training -0.2965 0.2552 
5.2 Loyalty for duty -0.2686 -0.4937 
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Fig. 12  Sample plot from Quantification method type III 
 
Table 10  Sample score from Quantification method type III 
Sample No. Tendency 1 Tendency 2 Sample No. Tendency 1 Tendency 2 
i -0.53122 0.322439 xxv 0.080806 0.71504 
ii -0.14005 -0.54443 xxvi -0.14872 0.066629 
iii -0.26659 -0.31985 xxvii -0.64398 -1.6528 
iv -0.64827 0.194974 xxviii 0.878178 0.870433 
v -0.02753 -0.22608 xxix -0.11105 0.121997 
vi -0.26659 -0.31985 xxx -0.57455 2.179105 
vii -0.18344 -0.4074 xxxi -0.14865 -0.23135 
viii -1.42239 -4.40367 xxxii -0.41796 0.603777 
ix 4.05881 -0.78002 xxxiii -0.50924 -0.35613 
x -0.46762 -0.61879 xxxiv -0.41796 0.603777 
xi -0.50235 -1.09282 xxxv 3.774633 -0.99141 
xii -0.35511 -0.29143 xxxvi -0.4903 -0.23103 
xiii -0.50924 -0.35613 xxxvii -0.9958 -1.83219 
xiv -0.39122 -0.12425 xxxviii 1.571959 -0.21666 
xv -0.33386 -0.10377 xxxix 1.074642 -0.27119 
xvi -0.35311 2.929628 xl -0.33786 0.821082 
xvii -0.39122 -0.12425 xli 2.314721 -0.79546 
xviii -0.57062 -0.21975 xlii 2.452606 -0.41084 
xix -0.39122 -0.12425 xliii -0.48179 -0.20738 
xx -0.39122 -0.12425 xliv -0.34619 1.230411 
xxi 1.005226 0.410839 xlv -0.40109 0.943097 
xxii -0.39122 -0.12425 xlvi 3.309825 -0.17459 
xxiii 0.395974 0.653054 xlvii -0.69804 0.570705 
xxiv -0.52781 -0.33114 
 
 
 
i
ii
iii
iv
vvvii
viii
ixx
xi
xxiii
xivx
xvi
viixviiixx
xxi
xxiii
xi
xxv
xxvi
xxvii
xxviii
xxix
xxx
xxxi
xxxii
xiii
v
xxxv
xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviiixxxix
xl
xli
xliil i
xliv
xlv
xlvi
xlvii
-5.0 
-4.0 
-3.0 
-2.0 
-1.0 
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
-2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
Te
n
d
en
cy
 2
Tendency 1
Sample plot
 52 
 
 
4.2.3 Implication of the result of the analysis 
According to Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, most of the factors are plotted closely to each 
other at the center. Here, the center means the score is 0 (zero). The items are 
plotted near to each other have a strong correlation. Especially in Fig. 11, most 
of the factors plotted at the center would have a strong correlation.  
 
Looking at the plots at the center, the following categories are plotted closely to 
each other. 
1.1 Misjudgment & Mishandling 
1.4 Improper command and orders 
3.3 Severe weather conditions 
4.1 Lack of safety awareness of management personnel 
4.3 Ill-preparedness of the governing organization 
4.5 Lack of education & training 
5.2 Loyalty for duty 
 
Among the above factors, only „5.2 Loyalty for duty‟ counted as one in the 
accident cases (accident of xxxi. Kaiwo Maru). In addition, the accident reports 
which were collected in this research do not mention „Loyalty for duty‟ although 
this element might be included. Beside „5.2 Loyalty for duty‟, these factors seem 
to influence anchor handling accidents. 
 
In respect of „4.1 Lack of safety awareness of management personnel‟ and „4.3 
Ill-preparedness of governing organization‟, these factors are both management 
issues. As the ISM Code entered into force partially in 1997, the safety 
management system can solve these kinds of accident factors by using a 
Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle in the future. 
 
For that reason, the following four factors are focused on. 
1.1 Misjudgment & Mishandling 
1.4 Improper command and orders 
3.3 Severe weather conditions 
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4.5 Lack of education & training 
 
What kind of counter measures do we need? According to the above four factors, 
all of them were counted more than 23 times in total in the 47 cases. These are 
four of the top five factors as well (see Fig. 10). If it is assumed that „1.1 
Misjudgment and mishandling‟ and „1.4 Improper command and orders‟ are 
derived from the „4.5 Lack of education & training‟, it would be essential that 
education and training under severe weather should be emphasized. That is to 
say, lack of education and training under severe weather would largely influence 
anchor handling accidents.  
 
What kind of contents for education and training should thus be included? The 
next chapter discusses and suggests the model syllabus for a comprehensive 
anchor handling course. 
 
 54 
 
Chapter 5. Suggestions for anchor handling education and 
training 
 
 
In Chapter 4, the factors of anchor handling accidents were defined. For MET 
institutions, it is necessary to consider the availability of education and training on 
comprehensive anchor handling especially for the deck department as an operator. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, there have been no regulatory frameworks on the 
performance of anchor windlass at the international level such as the SOLAS 
convention, although the requirements for the anchor and its chain are laid down in 
the IACS requirements. It is important that proficiency in windlass handling is 
obtained for personnel at the management level such as master and chief mate 
because they are practically commanding either on the bridge or on the mooring 
deck. This education and training would need to supplement the lack of a 
requirement on anchor windlass as hardware. Especially, the competency under 
severe weather is essential regarding this issue. 
 
The education and training of the deck department is focused on here because 
none of the engineering officers have been involved in the accident cases mentioned 
in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the syllabus of anchor handling at the management 
level of the deck department is suggested as an amendment to the STCW 
convention. In addition, the availability of anchor handling education and training is 
also suggested. MET is divided into two parts; one is on-shore and the other is 
on-board. In fact, only practical training is required on-board. 
 
5.1 Syllabus for anchor handling education and training 
 
The education and training of anchor handling are essential at the 
management level of the deck department. Besides the aim, objectives and learning 
outcomes, the syllabus on anchor handling at the management level of deck 
department should cover the following items including both the theoretical part and 
practical part: 
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1. Legal framework on anchor, chain and anchor windlass; 
2. Basic principles of anchor windlass; 
3. Procedures for letting go and weighing anchor; 
4. Detection of dragging anchor and the appropriate action when dragging; 
5. Handling of anchors at extraordinary situations; 
6. Limit performance of anchor windlass and anchor holding power; 
7. Maintenance issues coping with engine department; 
8. Team management between bridge and forecastle for an emergency 
situation on anchor handling at a risk of danger. 
 
Taking into account the above items, a syllabus is suggested in the following 
tables. The suggested syllabus should be tacked on to the existing syllabus in the 
IMO Model Course 7.01 Master and Chief Mate – Competence 1.9 – 1.8 Anchoring 
(allocated hour: 6 hours). 
  
 56 
 
 
Table 11  Suggested Syllabus on anchoring and windlass operation 
Knowledge, understanding and proficiency 
1 Legal framework on anchor, chain and anchor windlass 
 
Required performance 
Understand the essential legal framework on anchor, anchor cable and anchor windlass 
 
1.1 Understand IACS requirement UR-A (concerning MOORING, ANCHORING and TOWING) 
1.2 Understand IACS recommendation part 10 
1.3 Understand National legislation, requirement related to anchor and windlass 
1.4 Explain a scope on the annual ship inspection regarding anchor, anchor cable and windlass 
 
2 Basic principles of anchor windlass 
 
Required performance 
Explain the principles of anchor windlass and basic operations of windlass handling 
 
2.1 Explain detailed mechanism and different types of system (Electric and Hydraulic) 
2.2 Describe function of the operational devices (Clutch, Brake, Stopper and Control Lever) 
2.3 Define function of safety devices which release the overload 
 
3 Procedures for anchoring and weighing anchor 
 
Required performance 
Demonstrate the procedures of ship handling for anchoring and weighing anchor 
 
3.1 Explain how to choose an anchorage and list the factors which influence the choice
*
 
3.2 State that an anchoring plan should be prepared in advance, showing direction and speed of 
approach and the dropping position(s), with checking bearings
*
 
3.3 Describe the preparation of anchors, including walking the anchor back for anchoring in deep 
water
*
 
3.4 Explain how to judge that a ship is stopped ready for letting go
*
 
3.5 Explain that positions should be obtained on letting go and again when brought up
*
 
3.6 Describe the use of anchor buoys
*
 
3.7 List the factors to consider in determining the length of anchor cable to be used as:
*
 
 the nature of the bottom* 
 the strength of current or wind* 
 the height of wave (swell) 
 the exposure of the anchorage to bad weather* 
 the amount of room to swing* 
 the expected length of stay at anchor* 
 
4 Detection of dragging anchor and the appropriate action when dragging 
 
Required performance 
Demonstrate how to detect dragging anchor; Describe the appropriate actions after detecting 
dragging 
 
4.1 Define dragging and explain how to detect it
*
 
4.2 Describe the actions to be taken when the anchor starts to drag
*
 
4.3 Demonstrate the appropriate engine use so as to prevent the dragging anchor 
 
  
                                                   
*
 Listed in the IMO Model course 7.01 (Italics) 
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5 Handling of anchors at extraordinary situations 
 
Required performance 
Demonstrate the procedure at extraordinary situations 
 
5.1 Explain how excessive yawing may break the anchor out of its holding and describe measures 
to control yaw
*
 (how to check swing of a ship) 
5.2 Describe how to bring a ship to an open moor
*
 
5.3 Explain what is meant by ‘foul hawse’ and how it occurs
*
 
5.4 Describe how to clear a foul hawse
*
 
5.5 Describe how to clear a fouled anchor
*
 
5.6 Describe how to buoy and slip an anchor
*
 
 
6 Limit performance of anchor windlass and anchor holding power 
 
Required performance 
Understand limit performance of standard anchor windlass and anchor holding power 
against external force 
 
6.1 Understand a limit performance of standard anchor windlass required in IACS UR-A and 
recommendation against external force (wind, current and wave) on different types of ships 
(Case study) 
6.2 Understand an anchor holding power against external force on different types of ships (Case 
study) 
 
7 Maintenance of anchor and anchor windlass 
 
Required performance 
Understand an importance of maintenance 
 
7.1 Understand an importance of marking each shackles 
7.2 Understand needs of periodical maintenance of anchor windlass (Brake liner, Safety devices, 
greasing) 
7.3 Explain how to maintain proper performance of anchor windlass 
 
8 Team management between bridge and forecastle for the emergency situation on 
anchor handling at a risk of danger 
 
Required performance 
Demonstrate an optimal performance between bridge and forecastle 
 
8.1 Demonstrate an optimal performance as a master on bridge at a risk of danger 
8.2 Demonstrate an optimal performance as a chief mate on forecastle at a risk of danger 
 
  
  
                                                   
* Listed in the IMO Model course 7.01 (Italics) 
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5.2 On-board training and its limitation 
 
The cadets who are candidates for watch officer of the deck department at 
operational level, as regulated in the chapter II/1 of the STCW convention, must have 
at least 12 months experience at sea. They are trained by using a training record 
book (TRB) and are assessed through it. A maritime administration can control their 
on-board training by using the TRB. However, the suggested training in this paper is 
not for the operational level. It would be difficult for a maritime administration to unify 
the on-board training without any criteria like the TRB. 
 
To be a Master, at least three years (36 months) experience on board a vessel 
(of more than 3,000 gross tonnage) is required under the STCW convention, 
although there is an exceptional condition. Then there is one question: can a liner 
ferry have the anchoring operation? Obviously, the crew of a liner ferry would seldom 
have experience of anchoring under a regular operation. In addition, another problem 
is how can they train anchor handling when the ship is underway? How many times 
per year can a crew have experience of anchor handling? In this paper, the real 
situation on-board ship was not researched concerning these issues, but there would 
be a lot of constraints to on-board training. For this reason on-board training would 
not be suitable for extraordinary situation training. 
 
 
5.3 Education and training on shore 
 
The education part and the training part should be considered separately here. 
The main part of the education is a classroom lecture although there are several 
styles of class such as seminars and buzz groups (Brown & Atkins, 1988). No matter 
how the style of a class is, teachers can convey their words in a class room. The 
essential aspects are qualified instructors, as laid down in regulation I/6 of the STCW 
convention, and effective study materials such as videos and pictures.  
 
On the other hand, in respect of the practical training on shore, so far there has 
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been no measure to implement the suggested syllabus. Especially, the place and the 
way (where and how) to carry out the anchor handling training under extraordinary 
situations could be an issue to be solved. Fortunately, as computer technology 
progresses, the use of a simulator may be the solution.  
 
In fact, an “Anchor handling simulator” has been developed and been used, yet 
it is used for the personnel of an anchor handling vessel in the offshore industry 
(Kongsberg). For this reason, a new simulator system which can reproduce all kinds 
of situations at anchor should be developed for implementing the suggested syllabus. 
This new system can be built up from an ordinary ship handling simulator. The 
concept of the system is shown in Fig. 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, the operation of the windlass is taking place at the mooring deck 
(forecastle deck). It must have a function of the operation there. However, the most 
Fig. 13  Hardware concept of anchoring simulator 
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important requirement is the control models in the computer. If the control models do 
not work like a real machine, the performance of the simulator would be useless. 
Furthermore, beside the performance of the simulator, the scenarios should cover 
the following items: 
 Ship handling training when anchoring (proper choice of anchorage); 
 Anchor watch training when the wind becomes severe; 
 Training for preventing the dragging of the anchor; 
 Behavioral training after dragging the anchor; 
 Heave-up-anchor training under severe weather in different conditions 
(wind, current and wave) to get to know the limit performance of the 
windlass; 
 Open mooring training; 
 Slipping anchor training; 
 Training for clearing a fouled hawse. 
 
 
5.4 The other possibilities for anchor handling training 
 
There are opportunities for having training on-board. These include emergency 
training and drills which are laid down in Regulation 19 of Chapter III of the SOLAS 
convention. The anchor handling drills and relevant on-board training can be 
recommended to be added to this regulation. However, compared with the other drills 
such as abandon ship drill and fire drill, the degree of importance would be lower 
because training of the emergency anchor handling is not directly related to a 
casualty. 
 
On the other hand, the performance of the anchor windlass depends upon the 
type and size of the ship. At least the management personnel, master and chief mate 
should grasp the limit performance of the anchor windlass of the vessel taking into 
consideration the external forces before they start working on board. This can be 
familiarization training for the management personnel in the deck department. Every 
ship is recommended to have this kind of familiarization training. 
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To sum up, no matter how the anchor handling education and training is, the 
opportunity for it should be increased. The implementation of the education and 
training mentioned in the recommended syllabus is not a proactive approach since a 
large number of anchor handling accidents have already occurred. 
 
IMO‟s prime duty is to act proactively in order to ensure that accidents do not 
happen in the first place (http://www.imo.org). At least, the same kind of accident as 
has happened before should not continue to occur.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
 
In this dissertation, anchor handling accident cases have been discussed and 
analyzed using the Quantification method type III. As a result, a model syllabus on 
anchor handling education and training has been recommended. To conclude this 
study, a summary of the each chapter is given here. 
 
In Chapter 2, the anchor handling accident cases that have occurred in recent 
years were described. In addition, the weather impact on peak gusts was examined. 
The following outcomes were considered in the chapter: 
1. Quite a number of anchor handling accidents have occurred, especially in 
recent years with the casualties being reported in stranding cases. 
2. Most of the weather stations in Japan have observed a trend in the 
increase of the peak gust year by year. 
3. According to the prediction made by JAMSTEC, it is reported that the size 
of the tropical cyclone will increase with ships being exposed to stronger 
winds than before. 
 
In Chapter 3, the characteristics of the anchor windlasses and the regulatory 
bases for anchor windlasses and the requirements for anchor handling education 
and training were discussed. The following items were found: 
1. The anchor windlass is essentially simple operation machinery, although a 
vital item of the ship‟s installation. 
2. There is a need to periodically maintain the anchor windlass. There is a 
slight difference in the operation alert between the types of motor used for 
the anchor windlass. 
3. There are no international technical requirements for the anchor windlass. 
It is only laid down in the IACS requirements and recommendations. 
4. There is no training requirement in the STCW on anchor handling in an 
emergency situation. 
 
 In Chapter 4, the accident cases classified by 5-M of the accident factors were 
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analyzed by using the Quantification method type III. As a result, the correlation of 
the accident factors and the major factors could be obtained. The following items 
were found in the chapter: 
1. The major factors correlated strongly were identified according to the 
analysis. These were : 
i. Misjudgment & Mishandling 
ii. Improper command and orders 
iii. Severe weather conditions 
iv. Lack of safety awareness of management personnel 
v. Ill-preparedness of the governing organization 
vi. Lack of education & training 
vii. Loyalty for duty 
2. The education and training under severe weather conditions should be 
taken into account. 
 
In Chapter 5, a syllabus concerning the education and training of anchor 
handling was recommended. In addition, the method of the implementation of the 
syllabus was also discussed. The following was found: 
1. Anchor handling education and training is necessary for the personnel at 
the management level in the deck department. 
2. The syllabus suggested is based on the one existing in the IMO Model 
course 7.01 (See Table 11). 
3. According to the discussion on the implementation of the syllabus, an 
anchoring simulator added to the ship handling simulator would be 
effective. 
 
In Chapter 6, the conclusion highlights the main findings of the study. 
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Annex I 
Raw data on Peak Gusts at weather stations in Japan - part 1 
Year 1. Wakkanai 2. Nemuro 3. Aomori 4. Miyako 5. Sakata 6. Niigata 7. Onahama
1967 29.5 28.7 28.5 23.6 34.2 30.0 22.9
1968 30.8 24.8 25.0 22.2 34.4 27.4 24.6
1969 34.8 32.6 24.4 26.2 36.0 31.8 25.5
1970 35.0 35.6 29.5 36.7 33.2 32.8 28.0
1971 30.5 34.0 24.5 30.1 31.4 29.4 29.4
1972 38.4 34.4 27.7 31.8 32.8 31.3 26.9
1973 33.2 29.0 25.2 30.6 29.0 32.5 22.2
1974 33.6 30.0 28.8 25.7 29.4 32.5 22.5
1975 29.6 35.6 22.5 29.2 30.6 33.1 21.9
1976 31.8 35.0 27.7 30.1 29.5 30.2 20.0
1977 29.2 28.4 25.5 23.5 25.6 26.6 19.2
1978 31.7 36.0 24.5 32.9 30.1 26.3 23.0
1979 31.8 33.2 32.6 30.9 35.5 33.0 37.2
1980 32.0 34.4 25.3 30.3 29.0 29.3 30.6
1981 34.0 30.3 32.0 35.8 37.4 37.5 31.0
1982 36.6 35.2 25.8 31.8 33.2 31.8 24.9
1983 30.5 37.2 31.0 28.7 31.4 27.8 23.4
1984 39.7 26.3 22.3 20.6 28.6 29.0 28.1
1985 32.9 27.0 32.5 31.2 28.2 26.0 29.6
1986 36.1 28.0 24.1 22.2 31.3 28.1 31.1
1987 28.8 32.7 30.4 29.0 32.3 29.8 27.6
1988 32.1 37.6 22.6 24.9 29.9 29.6 31.1
1989 27.8 29.3 23.2 33.9 29.2 26.4 30.4
1990 37.0 34.8 33.4 39.1 34.2 31.0 26.6
1991 28.9 34.5 53.9 35.2 45.9 45.5 28.0
1992 31.6 34.2 26.5 25.8 35.8 35.8 26.6
1993 33.9 33.7 30.8 25.2 31.0 28.1 26.6
1994 37.9 32.8 27.6 33.4 29.8 30.4 33.5
1995 44.9 34.5 29.2 30.2 33.3 31.2 25.8
1996 29.8 33.4 25.3 28.4 29.8 28.0 33.0
1997 27.4 33.5 26.3 25.1 37.0 28.8 27.8
1998 32.5 33.2 32.7 35.0 37.0 38.8 32.4
1999 29.8 36.2 31.9 30.6 34.1 35.4 30.9
2000 30.2 33.9 31.7 30.2 32.1 35.8 24.9
2001 30.3 32.8 31.7 29.4 34.1 29.7 24.3
2002 33.2 36.0 30.7 43.5 29.8 27.6 48.1
2003 34.1 36.8 34.0 28.6 30.2 29.5 31.1
2004 34.7 39.3 36.2 35.8 40.2 37.1 26.9
2005 37.6 37.1 28.6 29.9 34.2 33.2 29.7
2006 31.9 42.2 28.5 31.1 33.5 34.7 32.7
2007 32.1 35.2 28.6 38.9 34.1 30.6 35.4
2008 25.9 33.8 27.3 24.1 27.7 25.2 26.4
2009 25.6 35.4 33.4 24.6 28.9 24.8 29.3  
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part 2 
Year 8. Choshi 9. Izu O Shima10. Chichishima11. Omaezaki 12. Fushiki 13. Shiono Misaki14. Matsue
1967 32.6 35.6 - 35.5 33.5 48.5 25.6
1968 36.1 34.3 - 35.4 32.7 31.6 27.6
1969 32.3 36.0 25.2 34.8 21.8 37.2 27.0
1970 31.8 35.4 46.2 31.0 27.4 33.4 29.8
1971 49.0 37.5 29.7 30.1 26.4 32.8 34.0
1972 34.8 36.3 40.1 31.9 28.0 48.8 29.6
1973 27.3 32.0 27.0 26.3 28.4 25.1 27.8
1974 33.4 33.6 39.4 35.4 28.7 35.2 31.4
1975 35.3 33.8 35.9 27.0 30.0 30.8 24.6
1976 29.0 33.0 36.8 34.5 25.3 26.5 25.0
1977 28.4 35.0 29.7 30.5 24.3 25.8 24.1
1978 30.3 34.8 26.2 31.6 24.3 27.2 25.8
1979 39.0 45.2 24.4 43.2 31.7 38.4 32.9
1980 29.6 35.2 28.6 31.3 23.2 32.5 41.2
1981 36.4 36.4 31.3 33.4 23.1 32.5 31.7
1982 36.3 48.6 38.0 36.7 27.0 34.8 36.9
1983 30.5 35.3 58.6 32.1 25.8 36.0 29.6
1984 29.3 28.7 47.0 29.0 18.4 28.3 31.2
1985 45.8 56.7 36.4 35.1 19.2 27.1 28.1
1986 41.4 39.1 59.7 35.9 20.5 31.3 32.3
1987 32.4 37.0 40.7 28.4 30.8 32.3 32.7
1988 31.3 35.3 34.9 31.7 21.8 39.8 31.5
1989 35.4 45.0 47.0 28.6 22.4 33.1 31.7
1990 34.0 42.8 26.6 40.4 32.7 59.5 36.3
1991 30.6 35.4 37.1 34.8 37.7 31.7 56.5
1992 35.9 34.3 36.4 27.4 23.6 32.4 27.6
1993 30.4 29.6 28.1 31.7 31.2 33.4 31.2
1994 37.8 31.5 33.5 31.8 29.2 46.4 29.8
1995 46.9 43.9 32.7 33.5 23.9 30.6 30.6
1996 51.9 42.8 36.5 30.2 26.6 31.8 31.0
1997 33.5 36.4 55.1 36.1 29.2 35.7 37.1
1998 45.7 38.7 37.6 37.8 40.4 41.9 31.8
1999 35.7 33.4 29.1 35.8 25.0 35.7 37.5
2000 33.8 37.2 38.1 31.3 25.3 32.6 32.1
2001 37.6 42.9 32.5 31.1 25.3 38.2 28.8
2002 52.2 45.7 46.0 39.5 25.6 31.7 31.7
2003 35.1 33.0 55.6 30.9 25.0 42.0 32.2
2004 41.0 51.5 40.7 50.0 40.6 41.3 35.8
2005 39.6 57.0 38.0 45.7 27.4 31.1 29.9
2006 39.0 31.4 38.8 32.8 25.4 30.7 30.3
2007 40.5 41.2 40.8 37.9 27.5 32.8 35.3
2008 33.5 32.3 29.9 30.9 19.5 31.5 29.2
2009 37.5 31.7 42.9 31.4 30.3 40.4 26.9  
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part 3 
Year 15. Hiroshima 16. Murotozaki17. Shimonoseki18. Izuhara 19. Miyazaki 20. Tanegashima21. Minamidaito
1967 22.7 59.2 27.1 30.2 23.0 31.4 -
1968 23.8 52.9 32.6 47.2 25.8 47.2 34.0
1969 22.7 47.2 30.4 28.9 46.8 39.0 26.3
1970 40.0 64.3 40.4 27.9 27.3 30.4 29.5
1971 25.9 45.0 37.0 28.4 37.3 39.5 30.0
1972 25.2 49.2 36.2 33.0 25.5 32.0 35.2
1973 20.3 35.1 30.1 32.0 19.0 28.5 31.5
1974 28.0 48.9 26.2 28.8 27.5 29.3 46.3
1975 22.6 55.2 27.7 25.3 20.3 31.8 27.4
1976 31.1 35.1 36.4 30.8 28.3 30.3 56.6
1977 24.4 36.8 26.7 25.8 22.0 29.4 26.8
1978 31.4 37.0 42.2 30.8 22.9 31.9 36.9
1979 34.1 66.9 34.2 32.8 34.2 42.6 34.2
1980 30.0 36.2 29.0 39.0 31.0 42.1 42.2
1981 26.3 36.4 26.6 30.8 45.3 31.0 45.2
1982 31.6 50.3 28.6 31.0 36.7 37.2 41.2
1983 26.9 43.2 34.9 32.8 25.8 32.3 38.3
1984 28.7 33.7 28.2 26.5 21.8 33.9 31.2
1985 22.2 37.0 42.8 29.6 31.0 45.7 39.5
1986 24.9 37.2 30.6 33.3 18.6 31.6 53.5
1987 37.0 53.8 42.2 52.1 27.7 35.7 43.3
1988 22.6 40.8 31.6 32.3 24.8 31.7 50.7
1989 24.9 46.9 34.3 27.2 37.7 60.0 32.2
1990 34.0 63.5 30.6 34.1 36.0 47.6 48.4
1991 58.9 42.5 45.3 44.9 33.1 35.7 40.3
1992 26.4 52.6 35.1 28.2 38.1 42.5 40.4
1993 33.0 50.3 43.4 30.7 57.9 59.1 50.1
1994 27.7 48.8 29.4 34.3 26.0 36.1 40.6
1995 46.8 36.6 29.9 40.3 28.3 28.8 25.3
1996 27.4 44.3 39.2 28.1 36.4 44.7 47.4
1997 30.5 52.2 31.1 34.7 36.7 41.9 46.9
1998 28.7 59.6 27.7 26.9 25.5 32.8 30.0
1999 49.6 49.9 41.9 28.3 32.7 34.1 35.9
2000 28.6 42.6 31.1 33.9 26.0 32.1 61.5
2001 22.4 51.3 30.5 27.5 26.2 31.2 31.9
2002 29.9 45.7 28.6 36.8 26.7 33.2 49.5
2003 33.6 69.2 33.6 46.5 31.7 40.6 35.0
2004 60.2 60.9 39.4 48.7 44.3 45.2 52.8
2005 32.1 44.3 32.4 36.1 43.1 59.2 55.6
2006 34.9 37.7 37.0 35.4 34.2 32.5 27.9
2007 25.0 43.5 27.1 28.7 38.8 49.3 33.3
2008 23.1 30.1 21.6 22.9 23.1 33.8 24.8
2009 22.1 43.2 23.5 25.2 21.0 32.5 58.9  
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Annex II 
IACS UR-A Requirements concerning MOORING, ANCHORING and TOWING 
(Partial Extract) 
A1.1 Design of the anchoring equipment 
A1.1.1  The anchoring equipment required herewith is intended for temporary 
mooring of a vessel within a harbour or sheltered area when the vessel is 
awaiting berth, tide, etc. 
A1.1.2  The equipment is therefore not designed to hold a ship off fully 
exposed coasts in rough weather or to stop a ship which is moving or drifting. 
In this condition the loads on the anchoring equipment increase to such a 
degree that its components may be damaged or lost owing to the high energy 
forces generated, particularly in large ships. 
A1.1.3  The anchoring equipment presently required herewith is designed to 
hold a ship in good holding ground in conditions such as to avoid dragging of 
the anchor. In poor holding ground the holding power of the anchors will be 
significantly reduced. 
A1.1.4  The Equipment Numeral (EN) formula for anchoring equipment 
required here under is based on an assumed current speed of 2.5 m/sec, wind 
speed of 25 m/sec and a scope of chain cable between 6 and 10, the scope 
being the ratio between length of chain paid out and water depth. 
A1.1.5  It is assumed that under normal circumstances a ship will use only one 
bow anchor and chain cable at a time. 
A1.1.6  Manufacture of anchors and anchor chain cables is to be in 
accordance with UR W29 and UR W18. 
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Annex III 
IACS recommendation No.10 (2005) (Partial Extract) 
1.3 Windlass design and testing 
1.3.1 A windlass suitable for the size of chain cable and complying with the 
following criteria is to be fitted to the ship. 
1.3.2 The windlass unit prime mover is to be able to supply for at least 30 
minutes a continuous duty pull Zcont, corresponding to the grade of 
chain cables given by: 
Zcont = 37.5 d2 N (4.33 d2 kgf) grade 1 
42.5 d2 N (4.33 d2 kgf) grade 2 
47.5 d2 N (4.84 d2 kgf) grade 3 
where d = chain diameter (mm). 
These figures were determined taking into account the following 
conditions: 
(i) wind force equal to 6 on Beaufort Scale, corresponding, approximately, 
to 14 m/sec; 
(ii) water current velocity 3 knots = 1,54 m/sec. 
(iii) anchorage depth 100 m; 
using ordinary stockless anchor. 
The windlass unit prime mover is to provide the necessary temporary overload 
capacity for breaking out the anchor. The temporary overload capacity or "short 
term pull" should not be less than 1.5 the continuous duty pull and should be 
provided for at least two minutes. The speed in this period can belower than 
nominal. 
NOTE 
(a) The values of Zcont include the influences of buoyancy and hawse 
pipe efficiency which is assumed to be 70 percent. 
(b) The anchor masses are assumed to be the masses, excluding 
tolerances, as given in Table 2 above and in A1.4.3 Table 2. The 
chain masses are assumed, owing to the buoyancy, smaller than 
those in Table 3 and as given by P = 0,0218 d2kg per meter length. 
(c) Only one anchor is assumed to be raised at a time. 
1.3.3 Nominal speed of the chain cable when hoisting the anchor and cable 
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can be a mean speed only and this speed shall be not less than 0,15 
m/sec. The speed is to be measured over two shots of chain cable during 
the total trip; the trial should be commenced with 3 shots (82,5 m) of 
chain fully submerged. 
1.3.4 The capacity of the windlass brake is to be sufficient for safe stopping of 
anchor and chain cable when paying out the chain cable. If a chain 
stopper is not fitted, the windlass is to be able to withstand a pull of 80% 
of the breaking load of the chain without any permanent deformation of 
the stressed part and without brake slip. If a chain stopper is fitted it 
should withstand a pull of 80% of the breaking load of the chain. The 
windlass with brakes engaged and cable lifters disengaged is to be able 
to withstand a pull of 45% of the breaking load of the chain without any 
permanent deformation of the stressed parts and without brake slip. 
1.3.5 The stresses in the involved parts of the windlass, windlass frame and 
stopper have to be below the yield point of the material used. The 
windlass, its frame and the stoppers are to be efficiently bedded to the 
deck. 
Attention is to be paid to: 
(a) stress concentrations in keyways and at other stress raisers; 
(b) dynamic effects due to sudden starting or stopping of the prime mover 
or anchor chain; 
(c) calculation methods and approximation used when deriving the 
design stresses. 
 
